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Abstract
In this paper we address a specific computational aspect of belief revision: the size of the
propositional formula obtained by means of the revision of a formula with a new one. In particular,
we focus on the size of the smallest formula which is logically equivalent to the revised knowledge
base. The main result of this paper is that not all formalizations of belief revision are equal from this
point of view. For some of them we show that the revised knowledge base can be represented by a
polynomial-size formula (we call these results “compactability” results). On the other hand, for other
ones the revised knowledge base does not always admit a polynomial-space representation, unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses at a sufficiently low level (“non-compactability” results). We also
show that the time complexity of query answering for the revised knowledge base has definitely an
impact on being able to represent the result of the revision compactly. Nevertheless, formalisms with
the same complexity may have different compactability properties. We also study compactability
properties for a weaker form of equivalence, called query equivalence, which allows to introduce
new propositional symbols. Moreover, we extend our analysis to the special case in which the new
formula has constant size and to the case of sequences of revisions (i.e., iterated belief revision).
A complete analysis along these four coordinates is shown. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
In many areas of computer science, such as Databases and Artificial Intelligence (AI),
we are faced with the problem of constructing and maintaining up-to-date large bodies of
information. How can new facts be added to an existing database (or knowledge base)?
Intuition might suggest that we simply conjoin the formula P , representing the new
information, with our previous information T . However, this would destroy consistency
when T and P contradict each other. Moreover, even when T and P are compatible, simply
conjoining them might not lead to the desired result, as pointed out by Winslett in [27].
As remarked in [27], the problem of finding general methodologies to update and revise
data and knowledge bases has been studied in at least three research communities. In the
AI community, the problem of revising a set of beliefs naturally arises when we want
to construct an artificial agent that is able to operate in the real world. Since the real
world undergoes frequent changes the agent must be able to revise and modify its beliefs
accordingly to the new information acquired, without losing an overall consistency. In
the Database community problems with updates arose when incompleteness started being
introduced in a database via the use of null values and the update of views (see, e.g., [2]).
Finally, the meaning of belief revision has also been analyzed by philosophers. Recently,
Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1,12] have presented a general framework for
belief revision where the basic properties of belief revision are introduced and discussed.
There are two approaches to revision of logical theories, which are known in the
literature as belief revision and knowledge base update. To see intuitively their similarities
and differences, we consider a temporal diagram (Fig. 1), representing that
(1) our knowledge at time t1 was T , and
(2) at time t2 we come to know that P is true.
After t2 there is no doubt we have to assume that P is true, because it represents the
most recent observation. As far as T is concerned, things are not so obvious, since T ∧ P
might be unsatisfiable. Anyway, a general principle seems to be that we should retain most
of the information of T , if possible.
The main assumption in belief revision is that T was (at least partially) wrong at time
t1, because it came from non-valid observations. On the other hand in update we assume
that T was true at time t1, but the world of interest has changed between t1 and t2, so T is
no longer true after t2. The following example clarifies the two approaches.
Example. George and Bill share an office near yours, and you wonder whether they are in
the office or not. In what follows, propositional letters g and b denote that George is in the
office and Bill is in the office, respectively.
t
t2t1
PT
-
Fig. 1.
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Revision. Walking in the corridor, you hear someone talking in the office but you don’t
recognize his voice. Thus, you suppose that either George or his colleague is in the office,
and your knowledge is T = g ∨ b. Just beyond the corner you see George chatting with
someone. This can be formalized as P =¬g, so your conclusion is that the voice you heard
was Bill’s one (because T ∧ P ≡ ¬g ∧ b). A fundamental property of revision is that if
T ∧ P is not contradictory then the result of revising T with P is simply T ∧ P .
Update. Similarly to the previous case, you are walking in the corridor and hear a voice
from the office. Then, George exits the room and you meet him. T and P are exactly the
same as in the previous case. Nevertheless, you do not conclude that Bill was in his office,
because there is no evidence supporting this conclusion. The only fact you know for sure
is P . An interesting property of update is therefore that, even if T ∧ P is consistent, the
update of T with P is not necessarily equal to the conjunction of the two formulas.
More details on the difference between revising a knowledge base and updating it can
be found in [19]. Other general references on belief revision and update are [13,28]. For
an account of knowledge update in the context of probabilistic approaches, see [21]. From
now on, unless when explicitly stated, we will generically talk about revision of knowledge.
In symbols, we denote with T ∗ P the result of the revision of T with P . Both T and P
are propositional formulae.
Proposed formalizations of belief revision are very different in spirit, but, following Eiter
and Gottlob’s [8] presentation, they can be classified according to three orthogonal criteria.
• (Ir)relevance of syntax. Some of the approaches perform the revision by adding to
T the update formula P and retracting some sub-formula of T , in order to preserve
consistency. Such methods (e.g., [10,15,23]) are known as formula-based approaches.
On the other hand, most approaches deal with the models of T , thus not taking into
account the syntactic presentation of the knowledge bases. Such methods (e.g., [4,7,
11,25–27]) are known as model-based approaches.
• Measure of closeness. In model-based approaches the underlying idea is that the
models of T ∗P are the models of P intersected with (a superset of) the models of T .
Only the models of T which are closest to the models of P are added. Each formalism
has its own definition of what “being closer” means. Formula-based approaches are
guided by the principle of retracting a minimal set of sub-formulae of T .
• Revision versus update, which we explained intuitively above.
Other researchers [8,22,23,27] focused on computational properties of belief revision.
As an example, they addressed questions such as: given formulae T ,P,Q and a suitable
semantics for the revision operator ∗, what is the time complexity of deciding T ∗P |=Q?
In which cases polynomial algorithms exist? Same questions have been asked for the
problem of decidingM |= T ∗ P , where M is an interpretation.
Both aspects of belief revision (semantic and computational) are important from the
theoretical as well as the practical point of view.
In this paper we address a new specific computational aspect of belief revision: the size
of the revised theory T ∗ P . An informal description of our work follows. We insist that
T ∗P is represented as a propositional theory, i.e., we want a propositional theory T ′ such
that
{Q | T ′ |=Q} = {Q | T ∗ P |=Q}, (1)
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Q being any formula where only symbols of T or P occur. We call this property query
equivalence, and we say that a T ′ satisfying the above criterion is query equivalent to
T ∗ P .
The reason why we insist on T ∗ P being a propositional theory is twofold. From the
epistemological point of view, it seems reasonable that our set of beliefs does not change
the format of its representation after being revised. From the computational point of view,
it would be nice to split the task of deciding T ∗ P |=Q into two subtasks:
(1) compute T ′ such that (1) holds;
(2) decide T ′ |=Q.
There are two positive aspects in such a computational approach: the first subtask can be
done off-line, i.e., not necessarily when the query Q arrives. Moreover we could use the
same set of algorithms and heuristics both for subtask 2 and for regular query answering.
A question now naturally arises: what is the size of such a T ′? If the size of the smallest
T ′ is super-polynomial in the size of T plus the size of P , then the above mentioned
approach to query answering is clearly not practical. Moreover—from the cognitive point
of view—it is questionable to assume belief revision as the evolutionary model of an
agent’s mind: An agent would either need an unreasonable amount of storing space, or
change the format it uses to represent knowledge. The main result of this paper is that not
all formalizations of belief revision are equal from this point of view. For some of them
(e.g., Dalal’s [7]) we show that T ′ admits a polynomial-space representation (we call these
results “compactability” results). On the other hand we are able to prove that for other ones
(e.g., Ginsberg, Fagin, Ullman and Vardi’s [10,15] and Forbus’ [11]) T ′ does not always
admit a polynomial-space representation, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at a
sufficiently low level (“non-compactability” results). The time complexity of answering
T ∗ P |=Q on-line (T , P and Q being the input) has definitely an impact on being able
to represent T ′ compactly, although formalisms with the same time complexity may have
different compactability properties.
Winslett addresses this problem in [27] for the specific case where the size of P is
bounded by a constant, showing several compactability results. We give a complete analy-
sis, proving that some formalisms (e.g., Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s) are not com-
pactable even in such a restricted case, while other ones (e.g., Forbus’) are compactable.
A further aspect we address is the representation of a revised knowledge base using a
form of equivalence characterized by the following requirement
T ′ ≡ T ∗ P. (2)
We call this property logical equivalence, and we say that a T ′ satisfying the above criterion
is logically equivalent to T ∗P . Notice that a T ′ satisfying logical equivalence (2) satisfies
query equivalence (1) as well, but not the other way around. Basically, query equivalence
(1) gives the possibility of introducing new propositional letters, hence it yields formulae
T ′ with less information (e.g., model checking with respect to T ′ gives different results
in the two cases). This has definitely an impact on compactability: as an example, Dalal’s
formalization admits compact representations only according to criterion (1). As we prove
in this paper, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, Dalal’s formalization admits no
compact representation with respect to criterion (2).
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As further information arrives continuously, it may happen that a revised knowledge
base needs to be revised once again. In general, we talk about iterated belief revision when
an unbounded number of revisions occur. As far as the size is concerned, if a formula is
compactable after a single revision then it is not guaranteed that it is compactable after
several revisions. As an example, we show that Forbus’ operator—which admits compact
representations for the bounded revision/logical equivalence case—admits polynomially-
sized iteratively revised formulae only according to the query equivalence criterion, but not
for the logical equivalence criterion (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
Summing up, we provide a complete characterization of the compactability properties
for belief revision operators along four coordinates:
(1) the formalism;
(2) bounded versus unbounded size of the new formula P ;
(3) logical equivalence versus query equivalence;
(4) single revision versus iterated revision.
For what concerns non-compactability results, we use concepts such as Turing machines
with advice and non-uniform complexity classes, as well as results relating uniform
and non-uniform complexity classes. In fact, our results not only show unlikeliness of
propositional representations of revised theories, but are valid for a generic data structure,
i.e., any structure representing the result of the revision (cf. Section 7 for an exact
definition). As for compactability results, we show effective procedures for obtaining
compact representations.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains definitions about theories
of belief revision and non-uniform complexity classes. Section 3 contains the analysis for
the unbounded-size case; we prove compactability as well as non-compactability results.
Section 4 contains the analysis for the bounded-size case, while Sections 5 and 6 deal
with iterated belief revision, in the unbounded-size and bounded-size case, respectively.
The results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Section 7 presents results for generic data
structures and Section 8 contains some conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
The alphabet of a propositional formula is the set of all propositional letters occurring
in it. The special letter ⊥ denotes falsity, while > denotes validity. We use x 6≡ y as a
shorthand for (x ∨ y)∧ (¬x∨¬y), and x ≡ y for (x ∧ y)∨ (¬x∧¬y). Another shorthand
we use is x→ y for ¬x ∨ y . An interpretation of a formula is a truth assignment to the
letters of its alphabet. A theory T is a finite set of propositional formulae. We denote
with
∧
T the formula representing the logical “and” of all elements of T . When no
confusion arises, we simply write T for
∧
T . A model M of a formula P (theory T ) is
an interpretation that satisfies P (all formulae in T ). This is written M |= P (M |= T ).
Interpretations and models of propositional formulae will be denoted as sets of letters
(those which are mapped into true).⊥ is always mapped into false and> is always mapped
into true. Given a propositional theory T , we denote with M(T ) the set of its models.
The expression |W | denotes the size of W , e.g., the number of distinct occurrences of
propositional variables in W , if W is a propositional theory.
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Several notational conventions help presenting the revision operators. In particular, the
expression |S| denotes the cardinality of a set S, and symmetric difference between two
sets S1, S2 is denoted by S11S2. Recall that1 is an associative and commutative operator,
with ∅ as its neutral element.
If S is a set of sets,
⋂
S denotes the set formed intersecting all sets of S, and analogously⋃
S for union; min⊆S denotes the subset of S containing only the minimal (with respect to
set inclusion) sets in S; max⊆S denotes the subset of S containing only the maximal (with
respect to set inclusion) sets in S.
Given a propositional theory T we denote with V (T ) the letters appearing in T . In the
paper we frequently use the notion of substitution of letters in a formula. The notation
P [x/F ] denotes the formula P where every occurrence of the letter x is replaced by the
formula F . This notation is generalized to ordered sets: P [X/Y ] denotes the formula
P where all occurrences of letters in the set X are simultaneously replaced by the
corresponding elements in Y , where X is an ordered set of letters (in general, X ⊆ V (P))
and Y is an ordered set of formulae with the same cardinality of X. For example, let Q be
the formula x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3). Let X = {x1, x3} and Y = {y1,¬y3}. Then, Q[X/Y ] is the
formula y1 ∧ (x2 ∨¬¬y3).
2.1. Non-uniform complexity classes
As already pointed out, our proofs use the notion of non-uniform computation.
We assume the reader is familiar with (uniform) classes of the polynomial hierarchy
(P,NP,6p2 , . . . , and their complements), and we just briefly introduce non-uniform classes,
following Johnson [17].
Definition 2.1. An advice-taking Turing machine is a Turing machine that has associated
with it a special “advice oracle” A, which can be any function (not necessarily a recursive
one). On input s, a special “advice tape” is automatically loaded with A(|s|) and from then
on the computation proceeds as normal, based on the two inputs, x and A(|s|).
Note that the advice is only function of the size of the input, not of the input itself.
Definition 2.2. An advice-taking Turing machine uses polynomial advice if its advice
oracle A satisfies |A(n)| 6 p(n) for some fixed polynomial p and all nonnegative
integers n.
Definition 2.3. If C is a class of languages defined in terms of resource-bounded Turing
machines, then C/poly is the class of languages defined by Turing machines with the same
resource bounds but augmented by polynomial advice.
Any class C/poly is also known as non-uniform C , where non-uniformity is due to the
presence of the advice. Non-uniform and uniform complexity classes are related in [18,
29]. In particular, Karp and Lipton proved in [18] that if NP ⊆ P/poly then 5p2 = 6p2 =
PH, i.e., the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the second level, while Yap in [29, p. 292
and Theorem 2] generalized their results showing that if NP⊆ coNP/poly then5p3 =6p3 =
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PH, i.e., the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level. Such a collapse is considered
very unlikely by most researchers in structural complexity.
2.2. Revision operators
We now recall the different approaches to revision and update, classifying them into
formula-based and model-based ones. A more extensive exposition can be found in [8].
The boldface name prefixed to each approach will be used for further reference.
2.2.1. Formula-based approaches
Formula-based revisions operate on the formulae syntactically appearing in the theory T .
Let W(T,P ) be the set of maximal subsets of T which are consistent with the revising
formula P :
W(T,P )=max⊆
{
T ′ ⊆ T | T ′ ∪ {P } 6|= ⊥}.
GFUV. In [10] and in [15], the revised theory is defined as a set of theories: T ∗GFUV P .=
{T ′ ∪ {P } | T ′ ∈ W(T,P )}. Each theory of W(T,P ) has been called “possible world”
by Ginsberg, with no reference to possible worlds in modal logics. Logical consequence
in the revised theory is defined as logical consequence in each of the theories, i.e.,
T ∗GFUV P |=Q iff for all T ′ ∈W(T,P ), T ′ ∪ {P } |=Q. If a theory T ′ is also viewed as
the conjunction∧T ′ of its formulae, this consequence relation corresponds to consequence
from the disjunction of all theories. Hence, as far as logical equivalence is concerned, we
consider T ∗GFUV P as being equivalent to (∨T ′∈W(T ,P )(∧T ′))∧ P .
Nebel. The operator ∗N , proposed in [23], is an extension of Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–
Vardi’s one, in which the new theories are built based on a prioritized partition of the
formulae in T .
WIDTIO. Since there may be exponentially many new theories in T ∗GFUV P , a simpler
(but somewhat drastic) approach is the so-called WIDTIO (When In Doubt Throw It Out),
which is defined as T ∗Wid P .= (⋂W(T,P )) ∪ {P }.
Note that formula-based approaches are sensitive to the syntactic form of the theory.
That is, the revision with the same formula P of two logically equivalent theories T1 and
T2 may yield different results. We illustrate this fact through an example.
Example. Consider T1 = {a, b}, T2 = {a, a→ b} and P = ¬b. Clearly, T1 is logically
equivalent to T2. The only maximal subset of T1 consistent with P is {a}, while there are
two maximal consistent subsets of T2, namely {a} and {a→ b}.
Thus, T1 ∗GFUV P = {a ∧¬b} while T2 ∗GFUV P = {(a ∨ (a→ b))∧¬b} = {¬b}. The
WIDTIO revision gives the same results.
2.2.2. Model-based approaches
Model-based revisions obey the principle of “irrelevance of syntax” [7]. They operate
by selecting the models of P on the basis of some notion of proximity to the models of T .
We distinguish between pointwise proximity and global proximity.
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We assume both T and P to be satisfiable. As far as compactness is concerned, the cases
in which either T or P is unsatisfiable are not of interest. In fact, in the various semantics,
the result of revision is either T , or P , or the unsatisfiable theory, or undefined, hence
clearly compactable.
Approaches in which proximity between models of P and models of T is computed
pointwise with respect to each model of T were proposed as suitable for knowledge
update [19]. Let M be a model of T ; we define µ(M,P) as the set containing the minimal
(with respect to set inclusion) symmetric differences1 between each model of P and the
given M; more formally, µ(M,P) .=min⊆{M1N |N ∈M(P )} (we remind that models
are identified with the set of letters they map into true).
Winslett. In [27], Winslett defines the models of the updated theory asM(T ∗Win P) .=
{N ∈M(P ) | ∃M ∈M(T ): M1N ∈ µ(M,P)}.
Borgida. Borgida’s operator ∗B is the same as Winslett’s, except for the case when P is
consistent with T , in which case Borgida’s revised theory is just T ∪ {P }.
Forbus. This approach [11] takes into account cardinality: let kM,P be the minimum
cardinality of sets in µ(M,P). The models of Forbus’ updated theory areM(T ∗F P ) .=
{N ∈M(P ) | ∃M ∈M(T ): |M1N | = kM,P }. Note that by means of cardinality, Forbus
can compare (and discard) models which are incomparable in Winslett’s approach.
We now recall approaches where proximity between models of P and models of T is
defined considering globally all models of T . Let δ(T ,P ) .=min⊆⋃M∈M(T ) µ(M,P).
Satoh. In [25], the models of a revised theory are defined asM(T ∗S P ) .= {N ∈M(P ) |
∃M ∈M(T ): N 1M ∈ δ(T ,P )}.
Dalal. This approach is similar to Forbus’, but global. Let kT ,P be the minimum
cardinality of sets in δ(T ,P ); in [7], Dalal defines the models of a revised theory as
M(T ∗D P) .= {N ∈M(P ) | ∃M ∈M(T ): |N 1M| = kT ,P }.
Weber. LetΩ .=⋃ δ(T ,P ), i.e.,Ω contains every letter appearing in at least one minimal
difference between a model of T and a model of P . Following [8, p. 238], the models
of Weber’s revised theory [26] are defined as M(T ∗Web P) .= {N ∈M(P ) | ∃M ∈
M(T ): N 1M ⊆Ω}.
From the definitions it follows that the set of models relative to the model-based
approaches are related as described in Fig. 2, where each arrow denotes set containment.
To illustrate the differences between different model-based approaches, consider the
following example.
Example. Let T and P be two formulae on the alphabet {a, b, c, d} defined as:
T = a ∧ b ∧ c,
P = (¬a ∧¬b ∧¬d)∨ (¬c∧ b ∧ (a 6≡ d)).
T has only two models, which are:
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Fig. 2. Containment between sets of models for the various operators.
M1 = {a, b, c, d},
M2 = {a, b, c},
while P has four models:
N1 = {a, b},
N2 = {c},
N3 = {b, d},
N4 =∅.
The symmetric differences between each model of T and each model of P are shown in
Table 1.
Hence, the minimal differences between M1 and models of P are µ(M1,P ) = {{c, d},
{a, b, d}, {a, c}}; the minimal differences between M2 and models of P are µ(M2,P ) =
{{c}, {a, b}}. The cardinalities of set differences between each model of T and each model
of P are shown in Table 2.
Table 1
1 N1 = {a,b} N2 = {c} N3 = {b,d} N4 = ∅
M1 = {a,b, c, d} {c, d} {a,b, d} {a, c} {a,b, c, d}
M2 = {a,b, c} {c} {a,b} {a, c, d} {a,b, c}
Table 2
|1| N1 = {a,b} N2 = {c} N3 = {b,d} N4 =∅
M1 = {a,b, c, d} 2 3 2 4
M2 = {a,b, c} 1 2 3 3
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Winslett. The minimal differences in µ(M1,P ) correspond to the models N1,N2,N3 of
P , while those in µ(M2,P ) correspond to the models N1,N2 of P . Therefore, the models
of T ∗Win P are N1,N2,N3. The same result holds for Borgida’s revision, since T and P
are inconsistent.
Forbus. From Table 2 the minimum cardinality of differences between M1 and each
model of P is kM1,P = 2, corresponding to models N1 and N3; while kM2,P = 1,
corresponding to N1. Therefore, T ∗F P has models N1 and N3.
We now turn to global proximity approaches, where also entries in different rows of the
above tables are compared for minimality.
Satoh. The minimal differences between any model of T and any model of P are
δ(T ,P ) = {{c}, {a, b}}. These minimal differences correspond to models N1 and N2 of
P , which therefore are the models of T ∗S P .
Dalal. The minimum cardinality of all set differences is kT ,P = 1, corresponding to N1.
As a result, T ∗D P selects only the model N1.
Weber. Consider the union of all minimal global differences, that is Ω =⋃ δ(T ,P ) =
{a, b, c}. In Weber’s revision, one selects the models of P for which there exists a model
of T whose symmetric difference is included inΩ . Since all models of P have this property
(cf. Table 1), they are all selected. Thus, the revision coincides with P in this case.
There is an important property of model-based revision operators that we frequently use:
Proposition 2.1. Let M be a model of T and ∗ one of the revision operators {∗B,∗D,∗F ,
∗S,∗Web,∗Win}. Then, there exists a model N of T ∗ P such that M1N ⊆ V (P).
This property states that for every model of T there exists a model of T ∗ P whose
distance is bounded by the letters of P . This is sometimes crucial in showing the existence
of compact representations since it allows to focus our attention only on the letters of P .
This proposition is mentioned by Eiter and Gottlob in [8, proof of Lemma 6.1].
2.2.3. Iterated revision
All the operators proposed in the literature aim at formalizing the process of revising
a formula with a single update. Nevertheless, it is more realistic to formalize the result
of applying a series of revisions or updates to an existing knowledge base. The iterated
application of an update or revision operator is defined as follows: given a theory T and a
sequence of updatesP 1, . . . ,Pm, them-times repeated application of ∗ is (· · · (T ∗P 1) · · ·∗
Pm). That is, the result of revising T with P 1 is revised with P 2 and so on. In order to
simplify the notation, we assume that the revision operator ∗ is left associative. Thus, the
result of revising the theory T with a series of updates P 1, . . . ,Pm will be denoted as
T ∗ P 1 ∗ · · · ∗ Pm.
There are at least two possible computational approaches to deal with iterated revision.
The first approach incorporates each revision one-by-one into the knowledge base, while
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the second approach stores the initial knowledge base and the sequence of update formulae
and computes the result in a single step. As we show in Sections 5 and 6, the second
approach leads to compact representations in a larger set of cases.
2.2.4. Complexity of revision
As shown in what follows, the existence of compact representations for the revised
knowledge base is related to the complexity of model checking and inference for the
various revision operators. The complexity of these decision problems have been analyzed
in various papers. The complexity of deciding T ∗P |=Q (T , P andQ being the input) was
studied in [8]. The results are that in Dalal’s approach the problem is 1p2[logn]-complete,
while in all other approaches it is 5p2-hard (in some cases, 5
p
2-complete).
The complexity of model checking, that is, the complexity of deciding whether M |=
T ∗ P (where M is an interpretation and M , T and P are the input) is analyzed in [22].
Noticeably, formalisms with the same complexity with respect to inference have different
complexity with respect to model checking (e.g., Satoh’s and Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–
Vardi’s operators).
The complexity of inference for iterated revision was analyzed by Eiter and Gottlob [9].
2.3. Compact representations
In this paper we investigate the possibility of compactly representing, with a propo-
sitional formula, the result of an update or revision. We point out that the result of all
revision and update methods presented in Section 2.2 can be represented as a propositional
formula. However, it is difficult to know what is the size of the shortest formula represent-
ing the result.
We call an operator query-compactable if there exists a propositional formula of
polynomial size which has the same theorems of the result of the revision. More precisely:
Definition 2.4 (Query-compactable operator). An update or revision operator ∗ is query-
compactable if and only if there exists a polynomial p such that for any pair of
propositional formulae T and P there exists a propositional formula T ′ with the following
properties:
(1) |T ′|6 p(|T | + |P |);
(2) T ′ is query equivalent (cf. (1)) to T ∗ P .
In order to prove that some belief revision operators are not query-compactable we show
that this would imply some very unlikely consequences on complexity classes. In fact, as
we show in Section 7, reference to to complexity classes is necessary, because in some
cases proving logical-compactability is equivalent to prove long-standing open questions
in complexity theory. We now prove a general property that will be helpful in the proofs of
the following sections.
A decision problem, seen as the infinite set of its instances, can be partitioned according
to the size of the instances for a reasonable encoding (in the sense of [17]) of the instances.
In particular, we focus on the NP-complete problem 3-SAT [14, Problem LO2].
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Definition 2.5. We partition the set of instances as 3-SAT =⋃∞n=1 3-SATn, according to
their size n. For each n, we know that the number of distinct propositional letters occurring
in each instance of 3-SATn is at most n. Without loss of generality, we assume that all
formulae of 3-SATn are built on the same set of atoms Bn = {b1, . . . , bn}. For each n, pimaxn
is defined as the set of all the three-literal clauses on {b1, . . . , bn}, and mmaxn is the number
of clauses in pimaxn .
Note that pimaxn has size polynomial in n; in particular it has 2(n3) clauses, and
each literal can be represented with 2(logn) bits. Moreover, each instance pi ∈ 3-SATn,
considered as a set of clauses, is a subset of pimaxn ∈ 3-SAT. In Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 of this
section, and in Theorems 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 6.5, and 6.5 of the following ones, we refer to such
a partition of 3-SAT, and the related notation.
Theorem 2.2. Let ∗ be a revision operator. Assume there exists a polynomial p such that,
for each n > 0, there exists a pair of formulae Tn,Pn with the following properties:
(1) |Tn| + |Pn|6 p(n);
(2) for all pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists a formula Qpi such that:
(a) Qpi can be computed from pi in polynomial time;
(b) Tn ∗ Pn |=Qpi iff pi is satisfiable.
With the above hypothesis, if ∗ is query-compactable, then NP⊆ coNP/poly.
Proof. Assume there exists a polynomial p such that, for each n, there exists a pair of
formulae Tn,Pn with the properties stated. Now, assume ∗ is query-compactable. Hence,
for each pair Tn,Pn there exists a T ′n with the properties stated in Definition 2.4. Recall
that the problem of deciding whether T ′n |=Qpi (the input being T ′n,Qpi ) is in coNP. Then
we can define an advice-taking non-deterministic Turing machine in the following way.
First, we define the advice oracle as A(n)= T ′n. Observe that |A(n)| = |T ′n|6 p1(|Tn| +|Pn|)6 p1(p(n)), where p is the polynomial mentioned in the hypothesis 1 of the theorem,
and p1 is the polynomial mentioned in point (1) of Definition 2.4. Hence, the size of the
advice is bounded by a polynomial which is the composition of p1 and p.
Secondly, the machine operates as specified by the following pseudo-code:
(1) let pi be an instance of 3-SAT;
(2) n := |pi |;
(3) load A(n); (* = T ′n *);
(4) use pi to computeQpi ; (* in time polynomial in |pi | *);
(5) if T ′n |=Qpi
then return “true”
else return “false”;
By Definition 2.4, “true” is returned if and only if Tn ∗ Pn |= Qpi . Since ∗ is query-
compactable, the problem of checking T ′n |= Qpi is in coNP (the input being T ′n and
Qpi ). Therefore, the problem “is pi unsatisfiable?” can be solved by an advice-taking non-
deterministic polynomial-time machine whose input has size polynomial in |pi |. Since
3-SAT is an NP-complete problem, and co(NP/poly) = coNP/poly, this would imply NP
⊆ coNP/poly. 2
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Compactability with respect to logical equivalence is a property of belief revision
operators stronger than query-compactability.
Definition 2.6 (Logically-compactable operator). An update or revision operator ∗ is
logically-compactable if and only if there exists a polynomial p such that for any pair of
propositional formulae T and P there exists a propositional formula T ′ with the following
properties:
(1) |T ′|6 p(|T | + |P |);
(2) T ′ is logically equivalent (cf. (2)) to T ∗ P .
Note that if a belief revision operator is logically-compactable, then it is also query-
compactable. Similarly to query-compactability, in order to prove that some belief revision
operator is not logically compactable we show that this would imply some very unlikely
consequences on complexity classes. Moreover, as we show in Section 7 in some cases
proving query-compactability is equivalent to prove long-standing open questions in
complexity theory. We show a general property analogous to Theorem 2.2 that will be
helpful in the proofs of the next sections.
Theorem 2.3. Let ∗, p, Tn, and Pn be as in Theorem 2.2, and let the hypothesis of Theo-
rem 2.2 hold. If for each n > 0,
(2′) for all pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists an interpretation Mpi of Tn ∗ Pn such that:
(a) Mpi can be computed from pi in polynomial time;
(b) Mpi |= Tn ∗ Pn iff pi is satisfiable;
then, if ∗ is logically-compactable, then NP⊆ P/poly.
Proof. The proof has a structure similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2. With the hypotheses
stated, and assuming that ∗ is logically-compactable, for each pair Tn,Pn we can define a
T ′n with the properties stated in Definition 2.6. Recall that checking whether M |= T ′n (the
input being M,T ′n) is a polynomial-time problem. The advice-taking Turing machine is
defined similarly to the previous theorem.
In particular, the advice oracle is again defined as A(n)= T ′n, and its size is less than or
equal to p′1(|Tn|+ |Pn|)6 p′1(p(n)), where p′1 is the polynomial mentioned in point (1) of
Definition 2.6.
The machine operates in a similar way, in particular, the following pseudo-code
substitutes the corresponding lines:
(4) use pi to computeMpi ; (* in time polynomial in |pi | *);
(5) if Mpi |= T ′n
then return “true”
else return “false”;
By Definition 2.6, “true” is returned if and only if Mpi |= Tn ∗ Pn. Since ∗ is logically-
compactable, the last decision can be made in time less than or equal to O(p1(|Tn| +
|Pn|)+ |Mpi |). Therefore, the advice-taking Turing machine would globally work in time
polynomial in |pi |. Since 3-SAT is an NP-complete problem, this would imply NP ⊆
P/poly. 2
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Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 provide a general schema for the proofs of non-existence of
compact representations that we present in the paper. All our proofs use the same technique,
even though with major differences in the details.
We note that usage in AI of non-uniform complexity classes for proving unlikeliness
of existence of compact representations has been proposed for the first time by Kautz
and Selman in [20]. In particular, they showed that existence of a polynomial-size
representation of the Horn upper bound of a propositional formula implies that NP ⊆
P/poly.
Horn upper bounds have been studied in the context of approximate knowledge
compilation, an approach to intractability of reasoning in AI that tries to move off-line
a significant part of the computational burden of reasoning, at the cost of losing either
soundness or completeness. In [16], Gogic et al. have considered approximate knowledge
compilation of the revision of a formula, showing that in some cases such an approximation
can be computed in linear time. In this paper we do not deal with approximation of
formulae, but only with representations preserving equivalence.
3. Single unbounded revision
The purpose of this section is to show an analysis of logical- and query-compactability
of revision operators. We consider revision operators mentioned in Section 2, and show
both compactability and non-compactability results. There is no assumption on the size of
the formula P ; the bounded-size case will be addressed in the next section. Moreover, we
consider only a single revision. Notice that WIDTIO semantics is logically compactable
(hence query compactable) since it immediately follows from its definition that the size of
T ∗Wid P is always less than or equal to |T | + |P |.
3.1. Query compactability
In this subsection we investigate query compactability. We begin our investigation
focusing on Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s operator. Other researchers have already
noticed that the explicit representation of the result of revising a knowledge base under
Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s semantics might have exponential size.
We introduce this problem with an example presented by Nebel [24]. Let
T1 = {x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym},
P1 =
m∧
i=1
(xi 6≡ yi).
The set W(T1,P1) contains 2m distinct theories, each one containing, for each i (1 6
i 6 m), exactly one of xi and yi . If we represent T1 ∗GFUV P1 as the disjunction of all
theories in W(T1,P1), conjoined with P1, the size of this representation is exponential in
|T1| + |P1|.
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The problem of the explosion of the size of the revised knowledge base was also pointed
out by Winslett [27] with another example:
T2 = {x1, y1, z1 ≡ (¬x1 ∨¬y1),
...
...
...
xi, yi, zi ≡ (zi−1 ∧ (¬xi ∨¬yi)),
...
...
...
xm, ym, zm ≡ (zm−1 ∧ (¬xm ∨¬ym))}
P2 = zm
Again, the cardinality of the setW(T2,P2) is exponential inm (note that in this example the
size of P2 does not depend on m). These two examples show that, in general, given T and
P , the “obvious” representation of T ∗GFUV P might have size exponential in |T | + |P |.
However, they do not rule out the existence of a different representation of polynomial size.
As Winslett notes [27, p. 34] the exponential increase in the size is proven if we “assume
a completely naive storage organization, where the theories are written out as we would
write them down on paper”. Later on she also conjectures that “these bounds hold even for
clever storage schemes”.
We now show that her conjecture on Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s revision is indeed
true for the more general case of query equivalence. This result is later generalized to other
revision operators. We recall that the symbol Bn denotes the set of letters {b1, . . . , bn} used
to build all formulae in 3-SATn.
Theorem 3.1. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, the revision operator ∗GFUV is not query-com-
pactable.
Proof. We apply the general schema of Theorem 2.2 and the notation of Definition 2.5.
We show that, for any integer n, there exists a formula Pn and a set of atomic facts Tn, both
depending only on n, of polynomial size with respect to n, with the following property:
given any pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists a query Qpi such that pi is satisfiable if and only if
Tn ∗GFUV Pn |=Qpi .
Let L be the alphabet Bn ∪ C ∪ D ∪ {r}, where r is a new distinct atom, while C
and D are sets of new atoms one-to-one with the elements of pimaxn . In other words,
C = {ci | γi ∈ pimaxn } and D = {di | γi ∈ pimaxn }.
We define Tn and Pn on the alphabet L according to the following rules:
Tn = C ∪D ∪Bn ∪ {r}, (3)
Pn =
[(
n∧
i=1
{¬bi | bi ∈ Bn} ∧ ¬r
)
∨
mmaxn∧
j=1
(cj → γj )
]
∧
mmaxn∧
j=1
(cj 6≡ dj ). (4)
We define Wpi and Qpi as follows:
Wpi = {ci | γi ∈ pi} ∪ {di | γi /∈ pi},
Qpi =Wpi → r.
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The interpretation on C ∪D which is the unique model of Wpi will be denoted as Ipi .
The following remarks on Wpi ∪Pn are in order:
• No ci or di can be added consistently to Wpi ∪ Pn, because Pn imposes that ci 6≡ di .
• The theory Wpi ∪ Pn is consistent, because the interpretation I ′pi that extends Ipi by
making false all atoms in B ∪ {r} satisfies both Wpi and Pn.
Now we are ready to prove our claim, i.e., that pi is satisfiable if and only if Tn ∗GFUV
Pn |=Qpi .
If. Suppose pi unsatisfiable. We show that Wpi ∪ Pn does not entail Qpi and that Wpi is a
world from W(Tn,Pn), i.e., that (1) Wpi ∪ Pn 6|=Qpi , and (2) Wpi ∈W(Tn,Pn).
(1) Since pi is unsatisfiable, for each interpretation H of the atoms of Bn, there exists a
γ ∈ pi such that H 6|= γ . Let J = Ipi be an interpretation on L, i.e., all variables of
Bn ∪ {r} are set to false. We have that
J 6|=
mmaxn∧
j=1
(cj → γj ).
Note that J is a model of Pn, because it satisfies
∧n
i=1{¬bi | bi ∈ Bn} ∧ ¬r and∧mmaxn
j=1 (cj 6≡ dj ). Moreover, J does not satisfy Qpi , because it satisfies Wpi and ¬r .
As a consequence,Wpi ∪ Pn 6|=Qpi .
(2) Adding to Wpi any other element of Tn would make Wpi inconsistent with Pn,
therefore,Wpi ∈W(Tn,Pn).
Only if. Suppose pi satisfiable. We show that all worlds in W(Tn,Pn) imply Qpi . Note
that all worlds not includingWpi implyQpi , hence we concentrate on those containingWpi .
Note that every W ∈W(Tn,Pn) such that Wpi ⊆W must contain r since
Wpi ∪
{mmaxn∧
j=1
(ci→ γj ),
mmaxn∧
j=1
(cj 6≡ dj )
}
is satisfiable. Moreover,W\Wpi ⊆ B ∪ {r}.
Since Tn is a set of literals, each such world W is uniquely characterized by its
intersection with Bn. For each interpretationH of the atoms in Bn, let WH,pi be defined as
follows:
WH,pi =Wpi ∪ {xi | xi ∈H } ∪ {r}.
If H does not satisfy pi then WH,pi ∧ Pn is inconsistent because WH,pi 6|= ¬r and WH,pi 6|=∧mmaxn
j=1 (cj → γj ), therefore, WH,pi /∈W(Tn,Pn). On the other hand, if H satisfies pi , the
interpretation J = H ∪ Ipi ∪ {r} of L satisfies WH,pi , Pn and Qpi . Since there exists at
least one interpretation H satisfying pi , the corresponding WH,pi is in W(Tn,Pn), and
therefore Wpi /∈W(Tn,Pn). As a consequence, for all elements W of W(Tn,Pn) we have
that W ∪Pn |=Qpi . 2
We now consider the model-based revision operators. Even though their semantics is
very different from Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s one, we obtain a similar result for
most of them:
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Theorem 3.2. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, the revision operators ∗B,∗S and ∗Win are not
query-compactable.
Proof. Eiter and Gottlob’s result [8, Lemma 6.1, point (2)] implies that T ∗GFUV P |=Q
iff T ∗B P |=Q iff T ∗S P |=Q iff T ∗Win P |=Q when T is a maximal consistent set of
literals, i.e., it has exactly one model, and V (P)⊆ V (T ). Note that these conditions hold
for the Tn defined in (3) and Pn defined in (4). 2
Using a proof similar to the one of Theorem 3.1, we can show that the same result also
holds for Forbus’ revision operator.
Theorem 3.3. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, the revision operator ∗F is not query-compact-
able.
Proof. We adopt the notation of Definition 2.5. We show that, for any integer n, there exist
two formulae Pn and Tn, both depending only on n, of polynomial size with respect to n,
with the following property: given any pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists a query Qpi such that pi is
satisfiable if and only if Tn ∗F Pn |=Qpi .
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, but we have now to consider closeness
between models because the revision operator ∗F is model-based. We still use a set C
of atoms which serve as “enabling guards” to select, among the clauses of pimaxn , those
belonging to pi . For each clause of pimaxn we now use n + 2 guards, which are always
forced to have the same truth value. Tn is defined in such a way that:
• for every two different models of pi the corresponding models of Tn have distance at
most n+ 1,
• given two different instances pi1, pi2 of 3-SATn a model in Tn corresponding to a model
of pi1 has distance at least n+ 2 from a model of Tn corresponding to a model of pi2.
For any given n, let C = {cji | 1 6 i 6 n + 2,1 6 j 6 mmaxn } be an (n + 2) × mmaxn
matrix of atoms (recall that mmaxn is the number of clauses in pimaxn ). Let L be the alphabet
Bn ∪C ∪ {r}, where r is a new distinct atom.
Let
Un =
mmaxn∧
j=1
n+2∧
i=2
(
c
j
i ≡ cj1
)
.
This formula forces all rows of the matrix C to be equal. Let Tn and Pn be defined as
follows:
Tn = {Un} ∪Bn ∪ {r},
Pn =
[(
n∧
i=1
{¬bi | bi ∈ Bn} ∧ ¬r
)
∨
mmaxn∧
j=1
(
c
j
1→ γj
)]∧Un.
Given pi ∈ 3-SATn, we define:
Qpi =
n+2∨
i=1
∨
γj /∈pi
c
j
i ∨
n+2∨
i=1
∨
γj∈pi
¬cji ∨
n∨
i=1
bi ∨ r.
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We show that Tn∗F Pn |=Qpi if and only if pi is satisfiable. Note that every interpretation
of L, but Mpi = ⋃n+2i=1 {cji | γj ∈ pi}, satisfies Qpi . Thus, we only need to show that
Mpi |= Tn ∗F Pn if and only if pi is unsatisfiable.
First of all, note that for each pi ⊆ pimaxn the interpretation Ipi defined as
⋃n+2
i=1 {cji | γj ∈
pi} ∪Bn ∪ {r} is a model of Tn.
The distance between Mpi and Ipi is exactly n + 1, while the distance from Ipi to any
other N ∈M(Pn), with a different valuation of atoms in C, is at least n+ 2. Hence, the
models of Pn that are closest to Ipi must have the same valuation of atoms in C.
Suppose pi unsatisfiable. The model of Pn closest to Ipi is now Mpi , since there is no
other model of Pn with the same valuation of C. Hence Mpi |= Tn ∗F Pn.
On the converse, suppose pi satisfiable. Let φ be the interpretation of the atoms in Bn
satisfying pi . The model Npi = Ipi − {b | b /∈ φ} is now inM(Pn), and its distance from Ipi
is at most n letters. Hence, Mpi is not a model of Tn ∗F Pn. 2
We now turn our attention to operators that are query-compactable. In particular, we
focus on Dalal’s and Weber’s operators (WIDTIO has already been discussed).
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be the alphabet of the initial knowledge base T and the revising
formula P , and Y = {y1, . . . , yn} be another set of (distinct) letters. In order to show that
∗D is query-compactable, we make use of a propositional formula EXA(k,X,Y,W), of
size polynomial in n, containing letters of X and Y , and possibly other letters W , which is
true iff the Hamming distance between the values assigned toX and Y is exactly k. We first
show that such a polynomial size formula exists, and then (cf. Theorem 3.4 below) that the
revised theory T ∗D P can be represented as T [X/Y ] ∧ P ∧ EXA(k,X,Y,W), where k is
the minimum distance between the models of P and T , denoted as kT ,P in the definition
of Dalal’s revision.
First of all, deciding whether the Hamming distance between two models is exactly k
requires time linear in the number of the atoms. Secondly, it has been proved (cf. e.g., [3,
Theorem 2.1]) that if a problem can be solved in time O(f (m)), m being the size of
the input, then there exists a circuit determining the solution of such a problem using
O(f (m) · logf (m)) gates. In our case, the input is composed of logn+2n bits representing
k and truth assignments to atoms in X ∪ Y . Therefore there exists a circuit of size
O(n · logn) determining whether the Hamming distance between two models is exactly k.
Such a circuit can be represented, with routine methods, as a polynomial size propositional
formula using literals from X ∪ Y , logn literals representing k, and a polynomial number
of new atoms W representing the internal nodes of the circuit. EXA(k,X,Y,W) is such a
formula. An explicit representation of EXA(k,X,Y,W) is shown in [5].
Theorem 3.4. Let X be the alphabet of T and P and let k be the the minimum distance
between models of T and models of P , i.e., k = kT ,P . Then T [X/Y ]∧P ∧EXA(k,X,Y,W)
is query equivalent (1) to T ∗D P .
Proof. Let Q be a query on the alphabet X and k be the minimal distance between
the models of P and T . We prove the theorem by showing that T [X/Y ] ∧ P ∧
EXA(k,X,Y,W) |=Q iff T ∗D P |=Q.
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If. We show that T [X/Y ] ∧P ∧ EXA(k,X,Y,W) 6|=Q implies T ∗D P 6|=Q. Let M be
a model of T [X/Y ] ∧ P ∧ EXA(k,X,Y,W) such that M 6|=Q. We have:
• M ∩X satisfies P ;
• since M satisfies EXA(k,X,Y,W), M ∩ Y satisfies T [X/Y ]; and
• M ∩ X has distance k from (M ∩ Y )[X/Y ] (this is the model obtained from M
by intersecting it with Y and then replacing any yi in the resulting set with the
corresponding xi ).
Since M |= P and k is by definition the minimal distance between models of T and P ,
M ∩X is also a model of T ∗D P . Therefore, T ∗D P 6|=Q.
Only if. We show that T ∗D P 6|=Q implies T [X/Y ] ∧ P ∧ EXA(k,X,Y,W) 6|=Q. Let
M be a model of T ∗D P such thatM 6|=Q. This model satisfies P . LetMT be a model of T
having distance k from M . Define M ′ as M ∪ {yi | xi ∈MT }. Obviously,M ′ satisfies both
P and T [X/Y ]. By definition of MT , M can be extended to an assignment to W so that it
also satisfies EXA(k,X,Y,W). Therefore, T [X/Y ] ∧ P ∧ EXA(k,X,Y,W) 6|=Q. 2
Now we show how Weber’s revision can be compactly represented. Winslett [27] gives
a similar proof, but only if the new formula has a size bounded by a constant. Our result,
instead, does not need such a restriction. Let Ω = {ω1, . . . ,ωk} be the set of letters in
the definition of Weber’s revision operator, and Z = {z1, . . . , zk} be a new set of letters
one-to-one with Ω .
Theorem 3.5. T [Ω/Z] ∧ P is query equivalent (1) to T ∗Web P .
Proof. Let X = V (T ) ∪ V (P) and Q be a formula on the alphabet X. We show that
T ∗Web P |=Q iff T [Ω/Z] ∧ P |=Q.
If. Assume that T [Ω/Z] ∧ P 6|=Q: we prove that T ∗Web P 6|=Q. By hypothesis, there
exists a model M of T [Ω/Z] ∧ P on the alphabet X ∪ Z such that M 6|=Q. From M we
build two models over the alphabet X as follows:
M ′ = (M ∩ (X\Ω))∪ {ωi | zi ∈M},
M ′′ =M ∩X.
We prove that M ′′ is a model of T ∗Web P andM ′′ 6|=Q. First, M ′ is a model of T , since
M is a model of T [Ω/Z] and M ′ is obtained by replacing the value of the variables in Ω
with the corresponding values in Z. Similarly, M ′′ is a model of P . Second, M ′ and M ′′
differ only on Ω . Thus, M ′′ is a model of T ∗Web P . Since M and M ′′ evaluate atoms in X
in the same way, Q is a formula over X, and M 6|=Q, it follows that M ′′ 6|=Q. As a result,
there is a model of T ∗Web P which is not a model ofQ, which implies that T ∗Web P 6|=Q.
Only if. Assume that T ∗Web P 6|=Q. We prove that Q is not implied by T [Ω/Z] ∧ P .
By hypothesis, there exists a model N of T ∗Web P such that N 6|= Q. This means that
N |= P and there exists a model M |= T such that M and N differ only for the atoms in
Ω . ModelsM andN are interpretations over the alphabetX. From them, we build a single
model H over the extended alphabet X ∪Z, as follows:
H =N ∪ {zi | ωi ∈M}.
It holds H |= P ∧ T [Ω/Z] and H 6|=Q. It follows that T [Ω/Z] ∧ P 6|=Q. 2
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We note that this representation of T ∗Web P increases the size of T only by—at most—
the length of P whereas the less “compact” representation of T ∗D P requires a formula
whose size is quadratic in the number of the letters.
3.2. Logical compactability
In this section we investigate logical compactability. In particular, we show that Dalal’s
and Weber’s operators, which are query-compactable, are probably not logically-compact-
able.
Theorem 3.6. Unless NP⊆ P/poly, the revision operators ∗D and ∗Web are not logically-
compactable.
Proof. We apply the general schema of Theorem 2.3 and the notation of Definition 2.5.
We show that, for any integer n, there exists a formula Pn and a knowledge base Tn, both
depending only on n, of polynomial size with respect to n, having the following property:
given pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists an interpretation Mpi such that pi is satisfiable iff Mpi is a
model of Tn ∗D Pn iff Mpi is a model of Tn ∗Web Pn.
Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} be a set of new letters in one-to-one correspondence with the letters
of Bn, and let C = {ci | γi ∈ pimaxn }. Finally, let L be the set Bn ∪ Y ∪C. Notice that L has
size O(n3). We define Tn as the conjunction of two formulae:
Tn =Φn ∧ Γn.
The 2CNF formula Φn states non-equivalence between atoms in Bn and their
correspondents in Y :
Φn =
n∧
i=1
(bi 6≡ yi).
Γn codes every possible set of clauses in pimaxn , using the atoms in C as “enabling
guards”. The formula is defined as:
Γn =
mmaxn∧
i=1
γi ∨¬ci.
Γn is a 4CNF formula and it contains O(n3) clauses. We define Pn as:
Pn =
n∧
i=1
(¬bi ∧¬yi).
Note that the size of Tn and Pn is O(n3). Moreover, Tn and Pn depend only on the size n.
We define Cpi = {ci ∈ C | γi is a clause of pi}. We divide the proof into two parts. We show
that:
(a) pi is satisfiable implies that Cpi is a model of Tn ∗D Pn;
(b) pi is unsatisfiable implies that Cpi is not a model of Tn ∗Web Pn.
Combining these results with the fact that all models of Dalal’s revision are also models
of Weber’s revision (cf. Fig. 2), we obtain that pi is satisfiable iff Cpi is a model of Tn ∗D Pn
iff Cpi is a model of Tn ∗Web Pn.
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Proof. (a) In every model of Tn exactly n atoms fromBn∪Y are true, while in every model
of Tn ∗D Pn all atoms from Bn∪Y are false. Hence, kTn,Pn > n. Moreover, kTn,Pn = n since
Bn is a model of Tn and ∅ is a model of Pn, and the cardinality of their difference is n.
Now, Cpi is a model of Pn, hence it is also a model of Tn ∗D Pn iff there exists a model of
Tn such that |Cpi 1M| = kTn,Pn = n.
Assume pi is satisfiable. Let Bpi be a model of pi , Ypi = {yi | bi /∈ Bpi } and M =
Cpi ∪ Bpi ∪ Ypi . We show that M is a model of Tn. In fact, M satisfies Φn by construction
of Ypi . M satisfies Γn as well, because for each clause γi ∨ ¬ci of Γn, either ci /∈ Cpi or
γi is satisfied by Bpi . Now observe that |Cpi 1M| = |Bpi ∪ Ypi | = n. Hence, Cpi is a model
of Tn ∗D Pn. Since the models of Dalal’s revision are also models of Weber’s revision, we
also have that Cpi is a model of Tn ∗Web Pn.
(b) We prove the claim by contradiction. Assume pi is unsatisfiable and Cpi is a model
of Tn ∗Web Pn. Then there exists a model M of Tn such that M ∩ C = Cpi . We claim that
M ∩Bn is a model of pi . Indeed, as for Dalal’s revision, M satisfies
Γn =
∧
ci∈C
γi ∨¬ci.
Simplifying Γn with truth values of M ∩C = Cpi , we conclude that M satisfies ∧ci∈Cpi γi ,
which is exactly formula pi . Since the formula contains only atoms from Bn, M ∩ Bn
satisfies pi , hence pi is satisfiable and contradiction arises. Thus, Cpi is not a model of
Tn ∗Web Pn. 2
We conclude the section by generalizing the negative results about query compactability
to logical compactability.
Theorem 3.7. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, the revision operators ∗B,∗F ,∗GFUV ,∗N,∗S,
and ∗Win are not logically-compactable.
Proof. The claim follows from Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and the fact that the non-existence
of a representation satisfying criterion (1) implies the non-existence of a representation
satisfying criterion (2). 2
4. Single bounded revision
In the previous section we investigated the issue of the existence of compact represen-
tations of revised knowledge bases. As it turned out, for most of the operators a compact
explicit representation of the result of revising a knowledge base with a new formula does
most likely not exist. From an analysis of the proofs, it turns out that this behavior de-
pends on the new formula P being very complex. There are some applications in which
the size of the new formula is very small with respect to the size of the knowledge base.
In database theory, for instance, scenarios with very large pieces of information are very
common, while modifications only concern a small part of the base. In this section we in-
vestigate which impact this assumption has on the existence of compact representations. In
particular, throughout this section we assume that the size of the new formula P is bounded
by a constant (k from now on).
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We first show that Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s revision remains not compactable
even under the above assumption.
Theorem 4.1. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, the revision operator ∗GFUV is not query
compactable, even if |P |6 k.
Proof. Let s be a new propositional variable. We define T ′n,P ′n from Tn,Pn in (3) and (4)
by T ′n = {f ∧ (¬s ∨ Pn) | f ∈ Tn} ∪ {¬s}, P ′n = s. It immediately follows that, for
all formulae Q on the alphabet V (Tn) ∪ V (Pn), we have that T ′n ∗GFUV P ′n |= Q iff
Tn ∗GFUV Pn |=Q. Assume that ∗GFUV is query compactable when |P |6 k. By the above
reduction we have that ∗GFUV is query compactable even when there is no bound on the
size of P . By Theorem 3.1 it follows that NP⊆ coNP/poly. 2
The situation for model-based revision operators is more complex. As it turns out all of
them admit a compact representation, with respect to both query and logical equivalence,
when the size of P is bounded.
Without loss of generality, since the size of P is bounded we assume that the alphabet
V (P) of P is included in the alphabet V (T ) of T (e.g., we can add to T the formula∧
p∈V (P )(p ∨¬p)). Because of the assumption of |P | being bounded by k, it follows that|V (P)|6 k. Without loss of generality, we assume |V (P)| = k, and denote letters in V (P)
as {v1, . . . , vk}.
We use the following notation: for every set of letters H , we denote with H the set
{¬x | x ∈H }. The formulaF [H/H ], whereH ⊆ V (F), is F with each letter inH replaced
by the corresponding letter in H (that is, its negation).
A useful property that we shall use is the following:
Proposition 4.2. For each interpretation M of the letters in V (F) and set H ⊆ V (F),
M |= F if and only if M1H |= F [H/H ].
In other words, if an interpretation M satisfies a formula F then, for any given set of
letters H , the model M1H , that agrees with M on all letters in V (F)\H and disagrees
on all letters in H , satisfies the formula F [H/H ]. For example, let F = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3),
M = {x1} and H = {x2, x3}. Note that M |= F . Applying the definitions, we obtain that
M1H = {x1, x2, x3} and F [H/H ] = x1 ∧ (¬x2 ∨ ¬¬x3). It follows that {x1, x2, x3} |=
x1 ∧ (¬x2 ∨¬¬x3).
4.1. Compactability of “pointwise” operators
We exhibit a compact representation of T ∗Win P which uses exactly the same alphabet
of T and P . Basically, we exploit the fact that we can explicitly represent all assignments
to V (P) in constant space, since |V (P)| = k.
Let S be an arbitrary set of letters such that S ⊆ V (P). Let us consider the formula
P ∧
∨
S⊆V (P )
(
T [S/S] ∧R)
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where
∨
S⊆V (P ) means a disjunction for all possible subsets S of V (P). This formula is
satisfied by a model N of P iff there is a model M of T (whose distance from N is given
by the set S), satisfying formula R.
In this formula S represents the distance between N and M . We define formula R in
such a way it specifies that there is no other model in P whose distance from M is less
than S.
R =¬
∨
C⊆V (P ), C1S⊂S
P [C/C]
where
∨
C⊆V (P ), C1S⊂S means a disjunction for all possible subsetsC of V (P), satisfying
condition C1S ⊂ S (an equivalent condition is C 6= ∅, C ⊆ S). This formula imposes a
condition over the distance C between two models of P . Namely, it forbids that C is
between M and N .
The whole formula is
P ∧
∨
S⊆V (P )
(
T [S/S] ∧ ¬
∨
C⊆V (P ), C1S⊂S
P [C/C]
)
.
This formula can be rewritten, applying De Morgan’s rule, to
P ∧
∨
S⊆V (P )
(
T [S/S] ∧
∧
C⊆V (P ), C 1S⊂S
¬P [C/C]
)
. (5)
It is easy to show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.3. Formula (5) has size linear in |T | and is logically equivalent to T ∗Win P .
Using Proposition 4.3 and the fact that T ∗B P is T ∧ P if consistent and T ∗Win P
otherwise, we obtain:
Corollary 4.4. There exists a formula of size linear in |T | that is logically equivalent to
T ∗B P .
We now exhibit a compact representation of T ∗F P which uses exactly the same
alphabet of T and P . The main difference between Forbus’ operator and Winslett’s one
relies on the fact that the notion of distance between models for the former one is based on
set cardinality, while for the latter one on set containment. As a consequence, we obtain
a formula very similar to the one obtained for Winslett’s operator. In fact, the formula
representing T ∗F P is the following:
P ∧
∨
S⊆V (P )
(
T [S/S] ∧ ¬
∨
C⊆V (P ), |C1S|<|S|
P [C/C]
)
(6)
(cf. formula (5) and note that here cardinality of sets is considered in the subscript of the
last disjunction). The proof of the theorem has been omitted.
Theorem 4.5. Formula (6) has size linear in |T | and is logically equivalent to T ∗F P .
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We conclude this section by showing an example of the formulae obtained by applying
formula (6).
Example. Let T and P be defined as:
T = a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e,
P =¬a ∨¬b.
T has just one model (call it M), while P has 3×23 models (each combination of the
models of ¬a ∨¬b with 2{c,d,e}). T ∧ P has no models. The models of P closest to T are
{a, c, d, e} and {b, c, d, e} (we have kM,P = 1). These are the models of T ∗F P .
V (P) is {a, b}. Applying (6), we get for T ∗F P
P ∧
∨
S={},{a},{b},{a,b}
(
T [S/S] ∧ ¬
∨
C⊆V (P ), |C1S|<|S|
P [C/C]
)
,
i.e.,
P ∧
(
(a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
∨
(
(¬a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬
∨
C={a}
P [C/C]
)
∨
(
(a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬
∨
C={b}
P [C/C]
)
∨
(
(¬a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬
∨
C={a},{b},{a,b}
P [C/C]
))
,
i.e.,
(¬a ∨¬b)∧ ((a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
∨ ((¬a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬(a ∨¬b))
∨ ((a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬(¬a ∨ b))
∨ ((¬a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)∧¬((a ∨¬b)∨ (¬a ∨ b)∨ (a ∨ b)))).
It is easy to verify that this formula has exactly two models: {b, c, d, e} (i.e., the unique
model of the subformula on the second line), and {a, c, d, e} (i.e., the unique model of the
subformula on the third line).
4.2. Compactability of “global” operators
For all global belief revision operators (Satoh’s, Dalal’s, and Weber’s) the result of the
revision of T with P is logically equivalent to a formula whose size is linear in the size
of T . This means that its size is polynomial whenever the size of P is bounded by a
constant.
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Theorem 4.6. The following equivalences hold:
T ∗S P ≡ P ∧
∨
S∈δ(T ,P )
T [S/S], (7)
T ∗D P ≡ P ∧
∨
|S|=kT ,P
T [S/S], (8)
T ∗Web P ≡ P ∧
∨
S⊆Ω
T [S/S]. (9)
The right-hand size formulas of those equations have size bounded by a polynomial in the
size of T .
Proof. The proof for Weber’s revision operator (9) follows immediately from Weber’s
original definition of ∗Web. We report a sketch for Dalal’s revision only, as the proof of the
other case is similar, and can be found in [5].
First of all, the considered formula has size polynomial in the size of T . Assuming the
size of P to be bounded by a constant, the number of sets S such that |S| = kT ,P or S ⊆Ω
is bounded by a constant, too. This implies that the size of formula (8) is linear in the size
of T .
Formula (8) is a disjunction of subformulas: each one P ∧T [S/S] is used to express a set
of models of P whose distance from a model of T is exactly S. Since S can be any set such
that its cardinality is kT ,P , the formula expresses exactly the result of Dalal’s revision. 2
Note that all representations can be simplified by omitting in the disjunction all T [S/S]
which are inconsistent with P .
We close the description of results for single revision with an example:
Example. We continue the previous example. Recall that T and P are defined as:
T = a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e,
P =¬a ∨¬b.
The set of minimal differences between models of T and models of P is δ(T ,P ) =
{{a}, {b}}. The models of P whose difference from a model of T is in δ(T ,P ) are
{a, c, d, e} and {b, c, d, e}. These are the models of T ∗S P . Since both differences have the
minimum cardinality, kT ,P = 1, these two models are also models for T ∗D P . Moreover,
since Ω = {a, b} = V (P), T ∗Web P has also the third model {b, c, e}.
Applying either formula (7) or formula (8), we get for T ∗S P = T ∗D P
P ∧
( ∨
S={a},{b}
T [S/S]
)
,
i.e.,
(¬a ∨¬b)∧ ((¬a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
∨ (a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)).
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This formula admits indeed the two models {b, c, d, e}, and {a, c, d, e}. Although it has
exactly the same two models as T ∗F P , it is syntactically much simpler.
As for T ∗Web P , formula (9) yields
P ∧
( ∨
S={a},{b},{a,b}
T [S/S]
)
,
i.e.,
(¬a ∨¬b)∧ ((¬a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
∨ (a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
∨ (¬a ∧¬b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)),
which admits also the model {c, d, e}.
4.3. Summary of results for single revision
In Section 3 and in the present section we have presented several results about the size
of a propositional theory T ′ representing the revision of a knowledge base and satisfying
either criterion (1) or (2). We proved that some formalizations of belief revision (e.g.,
Forbus’ and Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s) lead to propositional theories T ′ which
are intrinsically not representable in polynomial space (unless the polynomial hierarchy
collapses). In other cases, e.g., logical equivalence (2) for Dalal’s and Weber’s operators,
we showed polynomial-size representations which are equivalent to the revised theory. The
results are summarized in Table 3, where YES stands for compactable, while NO stands
for not compactable.
The following comments on the table are in order.
• First of all, we remind that:
– if an entry in a query equivalence column is “NO”, then also the corresponding
entry in the logical equivalence column must be “NO”;
– conversely, if an entry in a logical equivalence column is “YES”, then also the
corresponding entry in the query equivalence column must be “YES”;
– analogously, “NO” in the bounded case implies “NO” in the general case, and
“YES” in the general case implies “YES” in the bounded case.
• As for syntax-based operators (with the exception of WIDTIO which is obviously
compactable), the size of P is not relevant. Intuitively, this holds because a single
literal is able to generate an exponential number of distinct possibilities, cf. example
concerning the ∗GFUV operator in Section 3.1.
• As for model-based operators:
– in the bounded case the revision involves only literals occurring in P , hence
compactness is guaranteed, regardless of the equivalence criterion;
– in the unbounded case, revision according to query equivalence (1) can be
computed in two steps:
(1) computation of a “measure of the minimal distance” (e.g., kT ,P for ∗D , Ω for
∗Web, δT ,P for ∗S );
(2) using the measure for computing minimal sets.
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Table 3
Is the revised knowledge base compactable?
Formalism General case Bounded case
Logical equiv. (2) Query equiv. (1) Logical equiv. (2) Query equiv. (1)
GFUV, Nebel NO NO NO NO
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.1 Th. 4.1 Th. 4.1
Winslett NO NO YES YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.2 Prop. 4.3 Prop. 4.3, [27]
Borgida NO NO YES YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.2 Co. 4.4 Co. 4.4, [27]
Forbus NO NO YES YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.3 Th. 4.5 Th. 4.5
Satoh NO NO YES YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.2 Th. 4.6 Th. 4.6
Dalal NO YES YES YES
Th. 3.6 Th. 3.4 Th. 4.6 Th. 3.4, Th. 4.6
Weber NO YES YES YES
Th. 3.6 Th. 3.5 Th. 4.6 Th. 3.5, Th. 4.6, [27]
WIDTIO YES YES YES YES
– – – –
Only for ∗D and ∗Web the measure appears to be compactable.
Note anyway that the above two-steps method does not work for logical equiva-
lence (2), because it uses new letters. Summing up, Dalal’s and Weber’s formaliza-
tions have an interesting behavior: T ′ has no polynomial-size representation if we
insist on logical equivalence, but such a representation does exist if we ask only
query equivalence.
• Compactability is not directly related to the selectivity of the operators in choosing
the resulting set of models. The two model-based operators that more often admit
compact representations are ∗D and ∗Web. As shown in Fig. 2, ∗D is the most selective
operator while ∗Web is one of the least selective ones.
5. Iterated unbounded revision
In the previous sections we have analyzed the size of the smallest propositional
representation of the result of a single revision or update. We now turn our attention to
the size of the result of a series of revisions or updates. Obviously, we only investigate
operators that admit a compact representation after a single revision, since operators shown
uncompactable for a single revision are also uncompactable for a series of revisions. In the
style of Sections 3 and 4, we divide our analysis into two cases: the general one (considered
in this section), where no constraints are imposed on the sequence of m revising formulae
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{P 1, . . . ,Pm}, and the bounded case (considered in the next section), where we assume
that the size of each P i is bounded by a constant.
In the general case, we only need to investigate the properties of Dalal’s and Weber’s
operators under the query equivalence criterion. In particular, we show that Dalal’s and
Weber’s operators retain their compactability properties even if the revision process is
iterated m times, if we go for criterion (1), i.e., the initial language is extended.
For what concerns Dalal’s operator, note that the straightforward, m-times repeated,
application of Theorem 3.4 yields a formula of size exponential in |T | + |P | + m.
Therefore, we need to show a different formula.
Let EXA(r, S1, S2, S3) denote the formula defined in Section 3.1 and containing letters
of S1 and S2, and possibly other letters S3, which is true iff the Hamming distance between
the values assigned to S1 and S2 is exactly r .
Now let P 1, . . . ,Pm be the sequence of revising formulae. We denote with k1 the
minimum distance between the models of P 1 and T and with ki the minimum distance
between the models of P i and T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D P i−1. Moreover, we define X =
V (T ) ∪ V (P 1) ∪ · · · ∪ V (Pm) and we use a family Yi of sets of (distinct) letters, where
each member Yi of the family Y is one-to-one with X. Using this notation, the revised
theory T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm can be expressed as:
Φm = T [X/Y1] ∧ P 1[X/Y2] ∧ · · · ∧ Pm−1[X/Ym] ∧ Pm ∧
EXA(k1, Y1, Y2,W1)∧ · · · ∧ EXA(km,Ym,X,Wm).
Note that the formula contains m distinct instances of the formula EXA, each one
comparing sets of cardinality at most n. Thus, we have:
Theorem 5.1. Φm has size polynomial in |T | + |P 1|+ · · ·+ |Pm| and is query equivalent
to T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm.
Proof. Let Q be a query on the alphabet X. We prove the theorem by showing that
Φm |=Q iff T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm |=Q. The proof is by induction on m, and the base
case is proven in Theorem 3.4.
If. We show thatΦm 6|=Q implies T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm 6|=Q. LetM be a model of Φm
such that M 6|=Q, and let N =M ∩X. Since Q only uses letters of X, it holds N 6|=Q.
SinceM |= EXA(km,Ym,X,Wm), the distance between the two setsM ∩X andM ∩Ym is
exactly km. Let M ′ = (M 1(X ∪ Ym)) ∪ {xi | yin ∈M}. Note that, by construction, M ′ |=
Φm−1 and, by the inductive hypothesis, M ′ ∩X is a model of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm−1.
Therefore, M ∩ X has distance km from a model (M ′ ∩ X) of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm−1
and, therefore, it is also a model of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm.
Only if. We show that T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm 6|= Q implies Φm 6|= Q. Let Nm+1 be a
model of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm such that Nm+1 6|= Q. Hence there exists a model Nm
of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D Pm−1 such that the distance between Nm+1 and Nm is exactly km.
Inductively, for each i (16 i 6m− 1), there exists a model Mi of T ∗D P 1 ∗D · · · ∗D P i
such that the distance between Mi+1 and Mi is exactly ki . Now, let M be a model of
Φm such that M coincides with Nm on X. Since Q only uses letters of X, we have that
M 6|=Q. 2
M. Cadoli et al. / Artificial Intelligence 115 (1999) 25–64 53
Now we show how Weber’s revision can be compactly represented also for iterated
revisions. By Theorem 3.5 we know that the propositional representation of T ∗Web P only
increases the size of |T | + |P | by a linear factor. We denote with Ωi the set associated to
the ith revision step (T ∗Web P 1 ∗Web · · · ∗Web P i−1) ∗Web P i . To each Ωi we associate a
new set Zi , one-to-one with Ωi . Therefore, T ∗Web P 1 ∗Web · · · ∗Web Pm can be represented
by the formula:
T
[
Ω1/Z1; · · · ;Ωn/Zm
]∧ P 1[Ω2/Z2; · · · ;Ωn/Zm]∧ · · · ∧
P i
[
Ωi+1/Zi+1; · · · ;Ωn/Zm
]∧ · · · ∧ Pm (10)
where the substitutions must be performed in left-to-right order. Thus, we obtain:
Corollary 5.2. Formula (10) has size linear in |T | + |P 1| + · · · + |Pm| and is query
equivalent to T ∗Web P 1 ∗Web · · · ∗Web Pm.
We close this section with an example of the application of formula (10).
Example. We expand the example of the previous section. To highlight the one-to-one
correspondence between sets of letters, we use {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} instead of {a, b, c, d, e}.
We define T , P 1 and P 2 as:
T = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ x5,
P 1 =¬x1 ∨¬x2,
P 2 =¬x5.
T has just one model (call it M), while P 1 has 3×23 models and P 2 has 24 models.
Recall that Ω1 = {x1, x2} = V (P 1) and, therefore, T ∗Web P 1 has models {x1, x3, x4, x5},
{x2, x3, x4, x5} and {x3, x4, x5}. Now, Ω2 = {x5} = V (P 2). As a consequence, T ∗Web
P 1 ∗Web P 2 has models {x1, x3, x4}, {x2, x3, x4} and {x3, x4}. We define two sets Z1 =
{z11, z21} and Z2 = {z12}.
Applying formula (10) yields T [x1/z11;x2/z21;x5/z12] ∧ P 1[x5/z12] ∧ P 2 i.e.,(
z11 ∧ z21 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ z12
)∧ (¬x1 ∨¬x2)∧ (¬x5)
which admits the three models {x1, x3, x4, z11, z21, z12}, {x2, x3, x4, z11, z21, z12} and {x3, x4,
z11, z
2
1, z
1
2} which—projecting out z11, z21 and z12—are exactly the models of T ∗Web P 1 ∗Web
P 2.
6. Iterated bounded revision
In this section we assume that the size of all formulae {P 1, . . . ,Pm} of the sequence
of revisions is bounded by a constant. However, we assume that the number of revisions
is arbitrary, therefore, in order to show the existence of compact representations, we must
show formulae whose size is bounded by a polynomial in |T | +m.
We first focus on the query equivalence criterion. Note that the propositional formulae
presented in Section 4.2 increase exponentially in m their size if the revision operator
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is iterated m times. As a consequence, we first find new formulae, that only preserve
query equivalence, but that can be iterated without exploding the size. Since all the
representations are very similar, we only show the representation for Winslett’s operator.
Let V (T ) be the alphabet of T ; without loss of generality, assume that the alphabet
V (P) of P is included in V (T ). Because of the assumption of |P | being bounded by a
constant k, it follows that |V (P)|6 k. We assume |V (P)| = k, and rearrange subscripts in
such a way that V (P) = {x1, . . . , xk}. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yk} be a set of letters one-to-one
with V (P). Since T ∧P may be inconsistent, we replace in T the letters in V (P) with the
new letters Y . This yields the formula
T [V (P)/Y ] ∧ P. (11)
This formula is satisfiable—if both T and P are—but it is not query equivalent to T ∗WinP ,
since any model of P can be suitably extended to a model of (11). Hence we want to impose
further constraints to this formula. In the following we use the notation M|S to represent
the set of letters that are mapped into true by M and that belong to S, i.e., M ∩ S.
Let M be a model of (11), i.e., an assignment to V (T ) ∪ Y . Let V (P) denote the set
V (T )− V (P), i.e., letters of T not appearing in P . We partition M as M|V (P ) ∪M|V (P ) ∪
M|Y . Let M ′ = {xi ∈ V (P) | yi ∈M|Y }, i.e., M ′ =M|Y [Y/V (P )]. Observe that M is a
model of (11) if and only if M is a model of P and M ′ ∪M|V (P ) is a model of T .
By Proposition 2.1, it follows that the models of P which are closest to a model M of
T—i.e., having minimal set difference with M—agree with M on letters in V (P).
Therefore, a model M =M|V (P ) ∪M|V (P ) ∪M|Y of (11) should be discarded if there
exists another model of P which is closer to the modelM ′ ∪M|V (P ) of T . Let Z be a set of
letters one-to-one with V (P). In order to make the notation more compact, we introduce
three formula schemata:
FP (S)= P [V (P)/S],
F⊆(S1, S2, S3, S4)=
k∧
j=1
(
(s
j
1 6≡ sj2 )→ (sj3 6≡ sj4 )
)
,
where the sets S,S1, S2, S3 and S4 contain k letters each. The first schema FP ensures that
the assignment to S is a model of P , while the second one F⊆ states that for each truth
assignment to S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4 the set of atoms that have a different truth value in S1 and
S2 is a subset of the set of atoms that have a different truth value in S3 and S4.
Using this notation, we impose that an assignment to Z is a model of P with the formula
FP (Z). Since a model of (11) must be considered only if there is not a closer model, the
whole revision can be reformulated as the following quantified Boolean formula:
T [V (P)/Y ] ∧ P ∧ ∀Z.(FP (Z)∧ F⊆(Z,Y,Y,V (P )))→ F⊆(V (P),Y,Y,Z) (12)
where ∀Z is a shorthand for ∀z1 · · · ∀zk . This formula is now turned into an (unquantified)
propositional formula by replacing the universal quantification with a conjunction over all
assignments to Z. Since there exist 2|P | distinct assignments to Z, the total size of T ∗WinP
is O(|T | + |P | + 2|P |). Observe that the assignments to Z which are not models of P can
be discarded (they do not satisfy FP (Z), hence the implication simplifies to >), and the
simplified formula is linear in the number of models of P , hence it could be significantly
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smaller than 2|P |. Note that this explicit representation introduces new letters, hence it does
not preserve logical equivalence (2). A linear-size representation with new letters was also
shown by Winslett herself in [27].
Example. As in the last example, T = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ x5 and M is its unique model.
Now, we take P =¬x1. Note that T ∧ P has no models.
V (P) is {x1}. Let Y = {y1} and Z = {z1} be two new sets of letters. Applying (12), we
get for T ∗Win P
(y1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ x5)∧ (¬x1)
∧
∀z1.
((
(¬z1)∧ (z1 6≡ y1)→ (y1 6≡ x1)
)→ ((x1 6≡ y1)→ (y1 6≡ z1))).
Substituting the universal quantification with a conjunction corresponding to the two
possible assignments for z1 and considering that the assignment mapping z1 to true does
not satisfy FP (Z), hence it can be discarded, we obtain
(y1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ x5)∧ (¬x1)
∧((
(¬⊥)∧ (⊥ 6≡ y1)→ (y1 6≡ x1)
)→ ((x1 6≡ y1)→ (y1 6≡ ⊥))).
Now the formula could be simplified and rearranged; anyway, observe that its single model
is {x2, x3, x4, x5, y1} which—projecting out y1—is exactly the model of T ∗Win P .
Along the same lines, one could verify that Satoh’s revision T ∗S P is query-equivalent
to the quantified Boolean formula
T [V (P)/Y ] ∧ P ∧ ∀W∀Z.(FP (Z)∧ T [V (P)/W ] ∧ F⊆(Z,W,Y,V (P ))
→ F⊆
(
V (P),Y,W,Z
))
. (13)
Analogously, Forbus’ revision T ∗F P is query-equivalent to the quantified Boolean
formula
T [V (P)/Y ] ∧ P ∧ ∀Z.(FP (Z)
→¬(∃W1W2.DIST(Z,Y,W1) <DIST(V (P ),Y,W2))) (14)
where DIST(·, ·, ·) is a formula that computes the Hamming distance between the
assignments to the two sets of letters and W1 and W2 are two sets of new letters that
represent the intermediate results and must satisfy the appropriate constraints. Moreover,
the < operator can be represented with a circuit that compares the binary representations
of the two numbers DIST(Z,Y,W1) and DIST(V (P ),Y,W2).
As far as Borgida’s revision is concerned, since it coincides with Winslett’s one if T ∧P
is unsatisfiable and it is T ∧ P otherwise, a query-equivalent formula can be directly
obtained from formula (12).
Formulae (12), (13) and (14) only apply to the result of a single revision, but, differently
from formulae (5), (7) and (6), they can be extended to hold for a series of revisions. We
focus on Winslett’s operator.
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The main idea of the following construction is to define a series of formulae WINi that
are query equivalent to T after a series of updates with the formulaeP 1, . . . ,P i (i.e., T ∗Win
P 1 ∗Win · · ·∗WinP i ). These formulae WINi are built inductively, starting with formula (12).
In order to make the final formula understandable we introduce some notation.
Without loss of generality, assume that for each i the alphabet V (P i) of P i is included
in the alphabet V (T ) of T . If we assume that for each P i its size is bounded by a constant
ki , it follows that for each i , |V (P i)|6 ki . We assume |V (P i)| = ki . For each P i , let Yi
and Zi be sets of letters one-to-one with V (P i). Given a formula T and a series of revising
formulae P 1, . . . ,Pm, we start with formula (12) rewritten with index 1:
WIN1 = T [V (P 1)/Y1] ∧ P 1 ∧ ∀Z1.
(
FP 1(Z1)∧ F⊆
(
Z1, Y1, Y1,V (P
1)
)
→ F⊆
(
V (P1), Y1, Y1,Z1
)) (15)
and, inductively, we define:
WINi =WINi−1[V (P i)/Yi ] ∧ P i ∧ ∀Zi.
(
FPi (Zi)∧ F⊆
(
Zi,Yi, Yi ,V (P
i)
)
→ F⊆
(
V (P i), Yi , Yi,Zi
))
. (16)
It can be easily proved that the above formula is polynomial, and equivalent to Winslett’s
revision.
Theorem 6.1. Formula (16) has size polynomial in |T | + m and is query equivalent to
T ∗Win P 1 ∗Win · · · ∗Win Pm.
Given the similarities with Borgida’s operator, the size of the above formula is also an
upper bound for Borgida’s operator. A similar construction can also be applied to Satoh’s
and Forbus’ revision operators. As a consequence, we have that:
Theorem 6.2. The iterated version of formula (13) has size polynomial in |T | +m and is
query equivalent to T ∗S P 1 ∗S · · ·∗S Pm . Furthermore, the iterated version of formula (14)
has size polynomial in |T | +m and is query equivalent to T ∗F P 1 ∗F · · · ∗F Pm.
In order to prove that those revision operators are query equivalent to propositional
formulas of polynomial size, what is missing is to prove that formulas (12)–(16) can
be rewritten as propositional formulas (in the way they are currently written, they are
quantified Boolean formulas). This is done by replacing each universal quantifier with a
conjunction over all possible assignments over the quantified variables. Note that there are
only polynomially many assignments to the quantified variables.
Theorem 6.3. Formulas (12)–(16) can be converted into equivalent propositional formu-
las with an increase in size that is at most quadratic.
As a result, we have proved the query compactability of all the above revision operators.
Corollary 6.4. The iterated version of Winslett’s, Borgida’s, Forbus’, and Satoh’s revision
operators are query-compactable.
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We remark that the existence of a compact representation for Dalal’s and Weber’s
operators is guaranteed by Theorems 5.1 and 5.2.
6.1. Logical equivalence
While compact representations still exist if we go for query equivalence, this is not the
case for logical equivalence.
Theorem 6.5. Unless NP⊆ P/poly, there is no formula of size polynomial in |T |+m that
is logically equivalent to T ∗ P 1 ∗ · · · ∗ Pm, where ∗ ∈ {∗B,∗D,∗F ,∗S,∗Web,∗Win}.
Proof. The proof relies on (implicitly) showing that an unbounded number of bounded
revisions can accomplish the same task of a single unbounded revision. Since we know
that all of the above operators are not logically compactable when a single unbounded
revision is applied, this proves the result.
We apply an iterated version of the general schema of Theorem 2.3 and the notation of
Definition 2.5, so we show that for any integer n, there exists a sequence of n formulae
P 1n . . .P
n
n and a knowledge base Tn, all depending only on n, of polynomial size with
respect to n, such that given any pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists an interpretation Cpi such that pi
is satisfiable iff Cpi is a model of Tn ∗ P 1n ∗ · · · ∗ Pnn .
Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn} be a set of new letters in one-to-one correspondence with letters of
Bn, and C be a set of new letters one for each clause in pimaxn , i.e., C = {ci | γi ∈ pimaxn }.
Finally, let L be the set Bn ∪ Y ∪C. Notice that |L| is O(n3). We define:
Tn =Φn ∧ Γn,
where Γn = ∧mmaxni=1 ci → γi and the 2CNF formula Φn states non-equivalence between
atoms in Bn and their correspondent in Y :
Φn =
n∧
i=1
(bi 6≡ yi).
We define the set of n formulae {P 1n . . .P nn } as:
P in = (¬bi ∧¬yi).
Note that the size of Tn is O(n3) and the size of each P in is constant. Moreover, Tn and
{P 1n . . .P nn } do not depend on a specific 3CNF formula pi , but only on its size n.
We denote Cpi = {ci ∈ C | γi is a clause of pi}. We show that pi is satisfiable iff Cpi is a
model of T ∗ P 1n ∗ · · · ∗ Pnn , where ∗ ∈ {∗B,∗D,∗F ,∗S,∗Web,∗Win}.
We first show that the sets of models of (T ∗ P 1n ∗ · · · ∗ Pnn ) coincide for all considered
model-based operators. Equivalence is shown inductively on n. Let us consider the base
case and show equivalence of T ∗ P 1n for all operators. Let S = {N | ∃M ∈M(T ) such
that N =M/{b1, y1}}. First of all, note that all models in S satisfy P 1n since they contain
neither b1 nor y1. We want to show that S is the set of models of T ∗ P 1n for all of the
operators. In order to accomplish this, we only need to show that S is the set of models of
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T ∗D P 1n , T ∗Web P 1n and T ∗WinP 1n . The other equivalences follow from Fig. 2 and the fact
that T ∧ P 1n is inconsistent, and, therefore T ∗B P 1n coincides with T ∗Win P 1n .
Dalal. We observe that in every model of T for each i there is exactly one of bi and yi
that is true, while in every model of T ∗D P 1n both b1 and y1 are false. Hence, kT ,P 1n > 1.
Moreover, kT ,P 1n = 1 since Bn is a model of T and Bn − {b1} is a model of P 1n . Since S
is exactly the set of models of P 1n that have distance 1 from a model of T , it follows that
M(T ∗D P 1n )= S.
Weber. Note that Bn and Y are models of T , µ(Bn,P 1n ) = {b1} and µ(Y,P 1n ) = {y1}.
This implies that both {b1} and {y1} are in δ(T ,P 1n ) =
⋃
M∈M(T ) µ(M,P 1n ). Recall that
Ω1 =⋃ δ(T ,P 1n ). Hence, {b1, y1} ⊆Ω1. Moreover, for every model M of T , µ(M,P 1n )
contains no atom from C because for every subset of C there is a model of P in . Hence,
Ω1 = {b1, y1}. By definition of Weber’s operator it follows thatM(T ∗Web P 1n )= S.
Winslett. Given a modelM of T , we compute µ(M,P 1n ). If b1 ∈M then µ(M,P 1n )= b1,
otherwise if y1 ∈M then µ(M,P 1n ) = y1. As a consequence, we haveM(T ∗Win P 1n ) =
A∪B , where:
A= {N ∈M(P 1n ) | ∃M ∈M(T ): ((b1 ∈M)∧ (M1N = {b1}))},
B = {N ∈M(P 1n ) | ∃M ∈M(T ): ((y1 ∈M)∧ (M1N = {y1})}.
Since any model of T contains exactly one of y1 and b1, this set is equal to {N ∈M(P 1n ) |
∃M ∈M(T ): M1N ⊆ {b1, y1}}. This set clearly coincides with S.
By repeating the same line of reasoning, it follows that for all 1 6 i 6m we have that
k
T ∗DP 1n ···∗DP i−1n ,P in = 1, Ωi = {bi} ∪ {yi} and for any model M of T ∗Win P
1
n · · · ∗Win P i−1n
if bi ∈M then µ(M,P in)= bi , otherwise if yi ∈M then µ(M,P in)= yi . The equivalence
immediately follows.
Using the equivalence of all of the model-based operators it suffices to show that pi is
satisfiable if and only if Cpi is a model of T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D Pnn .
By definition, Cpi is a model of T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D Pnn iff there exists a sequence of m
models {M0,M1, . . . ,Mm} such that:
(1) M0 |= T ;
(2) Mi |= T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D P in;
(3) Mm = Cpi ;
(4) |Mi+11Mi | = 1.
If. Let pi be satisfiable, Bpi be a model of pi and Ypi = {yi | bi /∈ Bpi }. We define the
sequence of models as follows:
• M0 = Cpi ∪Bpi ∪ Ypi ;
• Mi+1 =Mi − {bi, yi}.
Note that conditions (3) and (4) are trivially satisfied, while condition (1) is satisfied
since M0 satisfies Φn by construction of Ypi , and also M0 satisfies Γn, because for
each clause ci → γi of Γn, either ci /∈ Cpi or γi is satisfied by Bpi . We show that also
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condition (2) is satisfied by induction on m. The base case is proven by condition (1);
Assume thatMi |= T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D P in . SinceMi+1 |= P i+1n and |Mi+11Mi | = 1 it follows
that Mi+1 |= T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D P i+1n .
Only if. Suppose Cpi is a model of T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D Pnn . Then there exists a sequence of
models {M0,M1, . . . ,Mm} such that
(1) M0 |= T ;
(2) Mi |= T ∗D P 1n · · · ∗D P in;
(3) Mm = Cpi ;
(4) |Mi+11Mi | = 1.
Since |Mi+11Mi | = 1, the differenceMi+11Mi contains exactly 1 atom fromBn ∪ Y .
Hence, allMi agree on the truth assignment to atoms of C, that is,Mi ∩ C = Cpi . We claim
that M0 ∩Bn is a model of pi . In fact, M0 satisfies
Γn =
mmaxn∧
i=1
ci→ γi.
SimplifyingΓn with truth values ofM0∩C = Cpi , we conclude thatM0 satisfies all clauses
in {γi | ci ∈ Cpi }, which is exactly formula pi . Since the formula contains only atoms from
Bn, the interpretationM0 ∩Bn satisfies pi , hence pi is satisfiable. 2
6.2. Summary of results for iterated revision
In Section 5 and in the present section we have shown several results about the size
of a propositional theory representing the iterated revision of a knowledge base and
satisfying either query equivalence or logical equivalence. In general, all formalizations
of belief revision considered (with the exception of WIDTIO) lead to logically equivalent
propositional theories which are intrinsically not representable in polynomial space (unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses). Restricting our attention to query equivalence, we
found situations where compact representations exist. Results are summarized in Table 4,
where YES stands for compactable, while NO stands for not compactable.
The following comments on the table are in order.
• First of all, if an entry is “NO” in Table 3, then it is “NO” also in this table.
• As for the general case, the “YES” entries are the same as in Table 3, because the
methods for compacting Dalal’s and Weber’s operators can be iterated without leading
to explosion of space.
• As for the bounded case:
– when logical equivalence is considered, this case is similar to the single revision
for the unbounded case, and non-compactability holds in all cases;
– when query equivalence is considered, although the proofs of compactness for the
single revision cannot be directly used, the methods have been adapted.
Tables 3 and 4 give also some indications on implementations and practical systems.
Note that exponential space is needed to store the result of a revision T ∗ P in almost all
cases. Hence, a reasonable strategy (as suggested by Winslett [27]) seems to be to delay
revisions P 1, . . . ,Pm and incorporate them when T ∗P 1 ∗ · · · ∗Pm is accessed. Moreover,
it is helpful to save the formulae P 1, . . . ,Pm even after incorporation, for possible further
revisions. In fact, polynomiality in Table 4 is guaranteed only if all formulae are available.
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Table 4
Is the iteratively revised knowledge base compactable?
Formalism Iterated general case Iterated bounded case
Logical equiv. (2) Query equiv. (1) Logical equiv. (2) Query equiv. (1)
GFUV, Nebel NO NO NO NO
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.1 Th. 4.1 Th. 4.1
Winslett, Borgida NO NO NO YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.2 Th. 6.5 Cor. 6.4
Forbus NO NO NO YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.3 Th. 6.5 Cor. 6.4
Satoh NO NO NO YES
Th. 3.7 Th. 3.2 Th. 6.5 Cor. 6.4
Dalal NO YES NO YES
Th. 3.6 Th. 5.1 Th. 6.5 Th. 5.1
Weber NO YES NO YES
Th. 3.6 Cor. 5.2 Th. 6.5 Cor. 5.2
WIDTIO YES YES YES YES
– – – –
7. Generalization and strengthening of results
Our results can be easily generalized in several directions. First of all, we can withdraw
the assumption that the result of a revision must be a propositional formula. Such an
assumption, which we made in the introduction, is motivated from both an epistemological
and a practical point of view. However, suppose the result of revision can be a generic data
structure which admits a polynomial-time algorithm for model checking; Definition 2.6
can be rephrased as follows:
Definition 7.1 (Logically-compactable (data structure) operator). An update or revision
operator ∗ is logically-compactable with a data structure if and only if there exist two
polynomials p1 and p2 and an algorithm ASK such that for any pair of propositional
formulae T and P there exists a data structure D with the following properties:
(1) |D|6 p1(|T | + |P |);
(2) for all interpretations M of V (T ) ∪ V (P) the call ASK(D,M) returns yes iff
M |= T ∗ P ;
(3) ASK(D,M) requires time 6 p2(|M| + |D|).
In the above definition the algorithm ASK ensures that the data structure D correctly
represents the set of models of T ∗ P , and can be used to perform model checking.
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Theorem 7.1. Let ∗ be a revision operator. Assume there exists a polynomial p such that,
for each n > 0, there exists a pair of formulae Tn,Pn with the following properties:
(1) |Tn| + |Pn|6 p(n);
(2) for all pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists an interpretation Mpi of Tn ∗ Pn such that:
(a) Mpi can be computed from pi in polynomial time;
(b) Mpi |= Tn ∗ Pn iff pi is satisfiable.
With the above hypothesis, if ∗ is logically-compactable with a data structure, then
NP⊆ P/poly.
As a consequence, our negative results also apply to all representations where the
equivalent of model checking can be decided in polynomial time.
A similar modification can also be applied to Definition 2.4 of query-compactability and
to Theorem 2.2.
In the previous sections we showed that, for many revision operators, it is very unlikely
that the result can be expressed with a compact propositional formula. In particular, the
existence of these representations would imply a collapse in the polynomial hierarchy,
which most researchers in computational complexity consider to be very unlikely.
However, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of compact representations
can be obtained quite easily by applying the technique used in [6, Proof of Theorems 6 and
7]. In fact, Theorems 2.3 and 2.2 can be, more precisely, formulated as follows:
Theorem 7.2. Let ∗ be a revision operator. Assume there exists a polynomial p such that,
for each n > 0, there exists a pair of formulae Tn,Pn with the following properties:
(1) |Tn| + |Pn|6 p(n);
(2) for all pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists an interpretation Mpi of Tn ∗ Pn such that:
(a) Mpi can be computed from pi in polynomial time;
(b) Mpi |= Tn ∗ Pn iff pi is satisfiable.
With the above hypothesis, ∗ is logically-compactable if and only if NP⊆NC1/poly.
We remind (cf. [17]) that the class NC1 consists of all languages recognizable
by log-space uniform families of Boolean circuits having polynomial size and depth
O(logn). Since NC1 ⊆ NC1/poly, NP 6⊆ NC1/poly implies NP 6= NC1. Hence proving
the unconditioned impossibility of logical compactability of a revision operator would be,
by Theorem 7.2, at least as strong a result as proving NP 6=NC1.
Theorem 7.3. Let ∗ be a revision operator. Assume there exists a polynomial p such that,
for each n > 0, there exists a pair of formulae Tn,Pn with the following properties:
(1) |Tn| + |Pn|6 p(n);
(2) for all pi ∈ 3-SATn, there exists a formula Qpi such that:
(a) Qpi can be computed from pi in polynomial time;
(b) Tn ∗ Pn |=Qpi iff pi is satisfiable.
With the above hypothesis, ∗ is query-compactable if and only if NP⊆ coNP/poly.
Using the above reasoning schema, Theorem 7.3 implies that if we are able to prove that
a revision operator is unconditionally not query-compactable, then NP 6= coNP.
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8. Conclusions
When we are faced with the problem of representing and updating a large body
of information, we must choose the most appropriate representation formalism and
revision operator. Our analysis suggests that important aspects in the choice of a revision
operator are its compactability properties. We presented several results about the size
of a propositional theory T ′ representing the revision T ∗ P of a knowledge base.
We considered both the query-equivalence criterion (1) and the more restrictive logical
equivalence criterion (2). In particular, we proved that some formalizations of belief
revision (e.g., Forbus’ and Ginsberg–Fagin–Ullman–Vardi’s) lead to propositional theories
T ′ which are intrinsically not representable in polynomial space. Dalal’s and Weber’s
formalizations have an interesting behavior: T ′ has no polynomial-sized representation
if we insist on logical equivalence (2), but such a representation does exist if we ask only
for query equivalence (1).
Furthermore, we investigated the impact of bounding the size of the revising formula
P . Several operators (e.g., Winslett’s and Satoh’s) are logically compactable only in such
a restricted case (cf. Table 3). We made another analysis about the impact of iterating the
revision process an unbounded number of times. The analysis showed that many revision
operators (e.g., Winslett’s and Satoh’s) become not logically compactable, although they
remain query compactable (cf. Table 4).
We proved non-existence of polynomial-sized representations subject to non-collapse
of the polynomial hierarchy. Anyway, proving unconditional non-existence of such
representations is equivalent to solving some long-standing questions in computational
complexity (cf. Section 7). Our results can also be generalized from propositional formulae
to general data structures.
There are several lessons to be learned from this analysis.
• WIDTIO is a very drastical approach, but always results in a logically compactable
formula.
• On the other hand, most belief revision operators have the undesired property that, in
the worst case, it is not feasible to explicitly store the result of revising an existing
knowledge base with a new formula.
• In particular, the syntax-based ∗GFUV operator has the worst behavior: it is
uncompactable even for query equivalence and in the bounded case (a single literal is
able to generate an exponential number of distinct possibilities).
• As for model-based operators, boundedness of P is a significant restriction: the
revision involves only literals occurring in P , hence compactness is guaranteed,
regardless of the equivalence criterion.
• Compactability and computational complexity of inference are different, although
somehow related. In fact, from Eiter and Gottlob’s work [8] it follows that two of
the computationally more difficult operators are ∗Web and ∗Wid; nevertheless, these
operators admit compact representations in more cases than computationally simpler
operators, such as ∗S and ∗GFUV .
• Compactability is also not directly related to the selectivity of the operators in
choosing the resulting set of models. As a matter of fact, the two model-based
operators that more often admit compact representations are ∗D and ∗Web. As shown
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in Fig. 2, ∗D is the most selective operator while ∗Web is one of the least selective
ones.
• The iterated bounded case is often similar to the single revision for the unbounded
case.
• Delaying revisions P 1, . . . ,P k and incorporating them when T ∗ P 1 ∗ · · · ∗ Pk is
accessed seems to be a reasonable strategy. Moreover, it is helpful to save the formulae
P 1, . . . ,P k even after incorporation, for possible further revisions.
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